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TEXT OP CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION 
I. Utah Constitution, article VI, section 1, 
reads as follows: 
The Legislative power of the State shall be 
vested: 
1. In a Senate and House of Representatives 
which shall be designated the Legislature of 
the State of Utah. 
2. In the people of the State of Utah, as 
hereinafter stated: 
The legal voters or such fractional part 
thereof, of the State of Utah as may be 
provided by law, under such conditions and in 
such manner and within such time as may be 
provided by law, may initiate any desired 
legislation and cause the same to be submitted 
to a vote of the people for approval or 
rejection, or may require any law passed by 
the Legislature (except those laws passed by a 
two-thirds vote of the members elected to each 
house of the Legislature) to be submitted to 
the voters of the State before such law shall 
take effect. 
The legal voters or such fractional part 
thereof as may be provided by law of any legal 
subdivision of the State, under such 
conditions and in such manner and within such 
time as may be provided by law, may initiate 
any desired legislation and cause the same to 
be submitted to a vote of the people of said 
legal subdivision for approval or rejection, 
or may require any law or ordinance passed by 
the law making body of said legal subdivision 
to be submitted to the voters thereof [i.e. 
referendum] before such law or ordinance shall 
take effect. [Emphasis added]. 
II. Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21, reads as follows: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, the legal voters of any county, city, 
or town, in numbers required by this chapter, 
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may initiate any desired legislation and cause 
it to be submitted to the governing body or to 
a vote of the people of the county, city, or 
town for approval or rejection, or may 
required any law or ordinance passed by the 
governing body of the county, city or town to 
be submitted to the voters before the law or 
ordinance takes effect. 
(2) (a) The legal voters of any county, 
city, or town may not initiate budgets or 
changes in budgets, or tax levies or changes 
in tax levies. 
fb) The legal voters of any county, 
citv. or town may not require any budget or 
tax lew adopted by the governing body of the 
county, city or town to be submitted to the 
voters. [Emphasis added]. 
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any 
state or territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. 
-viii-
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992)1 and Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 4. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the declaratory judgment claims, 
seeking a declaration of the Appellants' rights and legal 
relations under the referral provisions of the Utah 
Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2)(b) to refer or 
initiate any new tax legislation, are moot because the 3 0-day 
period for filing a petition against a specific Payson City 
utility tax ordinance has passed? 
Issue 2: Whether Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2)(b), on 
its face, violates Article VI, § 1 of the Utah Constitution 
which guarantees a right of access to the referendum and 
initiative process for "any legislation?" 
Issue 3; Whether Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2)(b), as 
applied to any new tax legislation or the Payson City utility 
tax ordinance, violates Article VI, § 1 of the Utah 
Constitution which guarantees a right of access to the 
referendum and initiative process for "any legislation." 
1. Hereinafter all citations to the Utah Code Annotated are to the most 
recent codification as amended. 
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Issue 4: Whether Utah Code Ann* § 20-11-21(2)(b) 
prohibits the people of Payson City from submitting an 
Application for Petition Copies when the underlying petition 
seeks to refer a newly enacted municipal tax legislation or 
the Payson City utility tax ordinance to a referendum vote? 
Issue 5; Whether the Payson City ordinance enacting 
the utility tax created a new tax scheme or was otherwise 
legislative in nature? 
Issue 6; Whether the Appellees refusal to issue 
petition copies deprived Appellants of their right to 
"petition the government for a redress of grievances" in 
violation of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
Issue 7: Whether Appellants are entitled to an 
injunction ordering Payson City to issue the requested 
petition copies in regard to the application and also allow 
Appellants a reasonable time to gather signatures in an 
attempt to file a petition against the Payson City utility tax 
ordinance? 
Issue 8: Whether the Appellants are entitled to an 
award of costs and attorneys fee under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 
1988? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Each of the above issues are questions of law which 
relate to the interpretation of statutes and constitutions. 
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Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court gives no deference to the 
District Court's conclusions• Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 
808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 
(Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CA8E 
I, statement of Facts. 
In article VI of the Utah Constitution the people of 
Utah expressly retained the right to refer or initiate any 
legislation. The Utah statutes that prescribe the method by 
which the people may commence a referendum or initiative 
require that five sponsors sign and file an application for 
certified petition copies (an "Application") with the city 
recorder. Utah Code Ann. §§ 20-11-7, 23. Once the 
Application is filed, the recorder is obligated to give the 
sponsors certified petition copies for circulation. 
The sponsors then circulate the petition copies in an 
effort to obtain the requisite number of signatures. After 
the appropriate number of signatures are obtained, the 
certified petition copies (the "Petition") are filed with the 
recorder. This Petition must be filed with the recorder 
within 30 days after the enactment of the ordinance being 
challenged. Utah Code Ann. §§ 20-11-24, 23. The recorder 
then verifies the signatures and marks the Petition as either 
"sufficient" or "insufficient." Utah Code Ann. §§ 20-11-16, 
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23. If the Petition is sufficient, the recorder prepares a 
ballot in which the citizens will be allowed to vote in favor 
of or against the question presented in the Petition. If the 
recorder refuses to accept the Petition and place it on the 
ballot, a citizen may file a writ of mandamus with this Court, 
within 10 days of the refusal, to compel the recorder to mark 
the Petition as sufficient and place it on the ballot. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 20-11-16, 23. 
On March 7, 1990, the Payson City Counsel passed City 
Ordinance No. 02-21-90a (the "Ordinance"), entitled "An 
Ordinance Establishing A Utility Revenue Tax To Be Collected 
On Gross Receipts For Electric, Gas, And Telephone Services In 
Payson City, Utah." (R. at 56-58). The Ordinance established 
an entirely new tax in Payson City whereby Payson City "levied 
upon the business of every person or company engaged in 
business in Payson City, of supplying telephone, gas, or 
electric energy service as public utilities, an annual license 
tax equal to 6 percent (6%), of the gross revenue derived from 
the sale and use of services of such utilities . . . within 
the corporate limits of Payson City." (R. at 58). 
On March 26, 1990, the Appellants and other concerned 
citizens timely filed an Application for Petition Copies for a 
referendum Petition requesting that the Ordinance be referred 
to the people of Payson City for their approval or rejection. 
(R. at 5). By letter dated April 2, 1990, the Appellees gave 
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notice to the Appellants that they would not provide the 
certified petition copies requested by the Application and 
stated that they were of the "opinion that § 20-11-21(2)(b) of 
the Utah Code prohibit[ed] submitting" the Ordinance to a 
referendum vote. (R. at 1). 
II. Proceedings Before the District Court. 
On October 17, 1990, the Appellants filed a Complaint 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State 
of Utah in which they requested that the court enter a 
declaratory judgment that Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2)(b) did 
not restrict their right to refer or initiate an ordinance 
that challenges or enacts a new tax scheme. (R. at 1-14). In 
the alternative, Appellants asked the District Court to enter 
a declaratory judgment that Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2)(b) 
was unconstitutional because it violated their rights under 
Utah Const, art. VI, § 1 to bring referenda and initiatives. 
(R. at 9-10). The Appellants asked for additional relief that 
a judgment be entered finding that the Appellees' conduct 
violated the Appellants' rights under the Utah and United 
States Constitutions and a judgment ordering Payson City to 
provide petition copies to the Appellants. (R. at 7-8). 
The primary thrust of Appellants7 case is the 
declaratory challenge of Payson City's refusal to recognize 
the Application and issue certified petition copies. In their 
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Complaint, the Appellants specifically sought the following 
relief (R. at 7-8) : 
1. A declaration that Article VI of the Utah 
Constitution allows citizens to bring a referendum 
or initiative against a new tax scheme. 
2. A declaration that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 20-11-21(2)(b)'s prohibition against "tax levy" 
referenda and initiatives does not include the 
legislative act of creating a new tax scheme and, 
if it does, that this statute is unconstitutional 
because it violates Article VI of the Utah 
Constitution. 
3. A declaration that Payson City's refusal to 
recognize the Application violated the citizen's 
federal and civil rights. 
4. An injunctive order that would compel Payson City 
to recognize the Application filed on March 26, 
1991 and issue certified petition copies. 
5. An order awarding reasonable attorney's fees under 
the Federal Civil Rights Act. 
On November 6, 1991, the Honorable Ray M. Harding of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County 
issued a Memorandum Decision, wherein the District Court found 
that (1) "Plaintiffs' failure to file the petition in thirty 
days as required by Statute, and the Constitution precludes 
their claim," (2) "had plaintiffs acted in a timely fashion 
they could have brought this claim, as this was a legislative 
not administrative manner [sic]," (3) the franchise utility 
tax "was an entirely 'new scheme of taxation' and that the 
creation of a tax is a legislative matter and is therefore an 
appropriate subject matter for referendum," and (4) "while 
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defendants should have given plaintiffs the petition, 
plaintiffs, according to the Constitution, should have taken 
appropriate action either to compel the petition be given to 
plaintiffs or prepared their own within the proper time 
limit." (R. at 265-266). As the prevailing party, the 
Appellants were instructed to "prepare [the] Summary Judgment 
within 15 days of the Memorandum Decision. (R. at 265). 
Believing that the Memorandum Decision memorialized 
the District Court's declaratory rulings on the declaratory 
judgment issues it presented in its Complaint, Appellants 
began to prepare the Summary Judgment Order. On or about 
November 13, 1991, Appellants received a telephone call from 
Appellees' counsel that the District Court was going to amend 
the November 6 Memorandum Decision to have the Appellees 
prepare the Summary Judgment Order instead of the Appellants. 
(R. at 267). 
Appellants immediately requested a telephone hearing 
before the District Court with opposing counsel to discuss the 
reasons for the District Court's amendment. During the 
telephone hearing with the District Court on November 19, 
1991, Appellants were informed that the District Court 
believed that findings 2, 3 and 4, above, were dicta and that 
the District Court had perceived that the a ruling on the 
time-bar claim had resolved the entire case. Appellants 
informed the District Court that such a ruling would not 
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resolve the declaratory judgment issues that were pending 
before the District Court and that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3 3-2 any person "whose rights, status or other legal 
relation are affected by a statute . . . may have determined 
any question of construction or validity arising under the 
. . . statute and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 
other legal relations thereunder." (See R. 271-282). Because 
the Appellants believed that the ruling on the time-bar claim 
did not resolve the other declaratory requests in its 
Complaint, Appellants filed a Motion to Rule on all Claims on 
November 22, 1991 in which Appellants requested that the 
District Court include findings 2, 3 and 4, above, as its 
declaratory rulings on the declaratory claims contained in the 
Complaint. (R. at 284-293). 
On November 25, 1991, Appellees filed a proposed form 
of Summary Judgment with the District Court for the Memorandum 
Decision of November 6, 1991, as amended. (R. at 321-323). 
On December 2, 1991, the District Court executed and filed the 
Summary Judgment and thereby ruled against the Appellees on 
"all claims." (R. at 321-323). On Dec€»mber 16, 1991, the 
District Court issued a Memorandum Decision wherein the 
District Court denied Appellants' Motion to Rule on All Claims 
because it considered it to be a "motion to reconsider the 
issues upon which this court has already ruled [and because] 
it is not a motion which exists under our rules." (R. at 333). 
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This appeal seeks review of the District Court's 
Summary Judgment dated December 2, 1991. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act authorized the 
Appellants to commence their declaratory judgment action and 
include therein damage and injunctive causes of action. Each 
of these separate, but combined, actions have distinct 
elements and limitation periods. The District Court failed to 
recognize the separate and distinct nature of the claims and 
committed manifest error when it concluded that all of the 
claims were moot because the injunctive claim for relief could 
not be awarded because the 30-day period for filing a petition 
had passed. This conclusion failed to recognize that the 
declaratory and damage claims did not deal with the filing of 
a petition but with Payson City's refusal to accept an 
application for certified petition copies, and that an action 
seeking a declaration of rights under a statute and provision 
of the constitution cannot become moot when the statute and 
provision are still in effect. This Court should reverse the 
District Court's conclusion that the declaratory and damage 
claims are moot and enter judgment on these claims. 
The enactment of the Payson City utility tax 
ordinance was the establishment of an entirely new tax that 
had not previously been imposed on the citizens of Payson 
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City. The establishment of this entirely new tax scheme was a 
legislative act, and as a legislative act, is subject to the 
referral and initiative provisions of Utah Const, art. VI, 
§ 1. When Payson City refused to provide petition copies to 
the Appellants it violated Appellants' rights under the Utah 
Constitution to refer "any legislation*" 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that 
states are not required to give their people the right to 
legislate and petition government through the use of 
initiatives and referenda. However, the United States Supreme 
Court has ruled, that when a state constitution gives the 
referral and initiative rights to its people, it creates a 
federal right (one protected under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments) to petition government and engage in political 
speech that cannot be abrogated by the state unless it amends 
its constitution to remove the right or has an overriding 
state interest. The Utah Constitution vests the people with 
the right to refer and initiate "any legislation." Thus, the 
people of Utah have a federally protected right to use the 
initiative and referral process. When Payson City refused to 
recognize Appellants' application for petition copies it 
unlawfully interfered with the Appellants' right to petition 
government and engage in free speech and violated the the 
First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act 
(42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
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Payson City has attempted to justify its interference 
with Appellants' constitutional rights by claiming that Utah 
Code Ann- § 20-11-21(2)(b) prohibits the referral and 
initiation of "tax levies," This argument is misplaced 
because the utility tax ordinance is not a tax levy. The term 
tax levy does not apply to the enactment of a new tax scheme, 
but only means the administrative act of setting the general 
property tax mill levy. Moreover, if the utility tax 
ordinance were, for some reason, included within the meaning 
of the term tax levy, then Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2)(b) 
would violate the Utah and United States Constitutions because 
it attempts to proscribe the referral and initiation of "any 
legislation." 
ARGUMENT 
I . THE DISTRICT COURT'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON THE 
INJUNCTIVE CLAIM FOR RELIEF DID NOT RESOLVE THE 
DECLARATORY CLAIMS FOR RELIEF OR RENDER THEM MOOT. 
The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act provides tha t 
p a r t i e s may advance declaratory and injunct ive claims for 
r e l i e f in the same act ion . 2 Once these claims are joined in 
an act ion the d i s t r i c t court must ru le on a l l claims before i t 
can terminate the ac t ion . Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Mistakenly, 
2. "The d i s t r i c t courts within the ir respect ive j u r i s d i c t i o n s sha l l 
have power to declare r ight s , s ta tus , and other l ega l r e l a t i o n s , 
whether or not further r e l i e f i s or could be claimed." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-33-1 . 
- 1 1 -
the district court concluded, that because the 4th claim for 
relief (injunctive relief) was barred, the other claims became 
moot and thus it would not decide the declaratory or damage 
issues. This conclusion is erroneous for the following 
reasons: 
First, contrary to the district court's conclusion, 
the gravamen of this case is not whether a referendum petition 
may now be filed. The conduct that is challenged in this 
case, and which generates the constitutional and statutory 
questions, is Payson City's refusal to accept the Application. 
At the moment the Application was denied, the Appellees 
violated state and federal law and caused the Appellants to 
suffer damage because their rights and ability to petition 
government for redress of grievances and engage in political 
speech through the discussions that come with the circulation 
of certified petition copies had been abrogated. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-12-28, a declaratory 
judgment action or action for damages may be filed to 
challenge Payson City's denial of the Application anytime 
within a two-year period of the date on which the Application 
was denied. The Court's conclusion that a Petition may not 
now be filed because 30 days has elapsed since the enactment 
of the utility tax has nothing to do with the time period in 
which an action may be brought to challenge whether the City 
acted inappropriately in denying the Application. 
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Second, this Court has ruled that declaratory 
judgments should be "liberally construed and administered" 
especially "where there is a substantial public interest to be 
served by the settlement of such an issue." Salt Lake County 
v. Salt Lake Citv. 570 P.2d 119, 121 (Utah 1977); see Whitmore 
v. Murray Citv. 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748, 751 (1944) 
("[Djeclaratory judgment is proper remedy 'whenever it will 
serve a useful purpose in settling the uncertainty'")(quoting 
Gray v. Defa, 135 P.2d 103 Utah 339, 251, 254 (1943)). 
Third, a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
determination of a party's rights under a particular 
constitutional provision and a particular statute cannot 
become moot when the constitutional provision and statute are 
still in effect and the party's rights are subject to actual 
or threatened controversy. See Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 144 6, 
1449 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); Energy 
Research Foundation v. Foote, 628 P.2d 173 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1981) (action seeking declaration of a party's rights under 
the Nonresidential Buildings Act became moot when the Act was 
repealed); Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 
121 (Utah 1977)(declaratory judgment action should proceed if 
it "appear[s] either that there is actual controversy, or that 
there is a substantial likelihood that one will develop so 
that the adjudication will serve a useful purpose in resolving 
or avoiding controversy or possible litigation"). 
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In the present case there is both an actual 
controversy and the likelihood that entry of declaratory 
judgment will resolve future controversy. The Appellants were 
denied certified petition copies under their Application. 
This denial made it more difficult, if not impossible, to 
timely file a Petition within 30 days because they would have 
to make their own circulation copies or raise sufficient money 
to file a legal action to compel the recorder to issue 
certified petition copies. This denial of the Application 
infringed on Appellants7 constitutional rights even before 
they were required to file a Petition that had been signed by 
the requisite number of voters. A determination that a 
Petition cannot now be filed because the 30-day period has 
elapsed does not answer the question whether Payson City's 
conduct in denying the Application was improper and violated 
Appellants' statutory and constitutional rights to file the 
Application. 
Furthermore, the entry of declaratory judgment in 
this matter will serve the useful purpose of setting forth the 
rights of the citizens of Utah and of resolving future 
controversy that need not come before this Court. The Court 
should be aware that taxes are still being collected from the 
Appellants under the utility tax ordinance and that the 
Appellants and other Payson citizens are currently preparing 
an initiative application that will challenge the very utility 
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tax that is at issue in this appeal. If a declaratory 
judgment is not entered declaring that the utility tax 
ordinance is legislative and subject to initiative, Payson 
City will continue to deny applications that are filed in 
relation to the utility tax ordinance and the Appellants will 
again be forced to either draft their own petition copies or 
to raise money to bring another declaratory judgment action. 
Appellants should not be forced to have to pursue these 
remedies every time they attempt to use their constitutional 
right of referral and initiative. The entry of declaratory 
judgment in this matter can resolve future controversy and 
obviate the waste of judicial resources.3 
To avoid this repetitive burden, the United States 
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have both 
ruled, in the initiative and referendum context, that a 
declaratory judgment action is proper even though the time for 
filing the Petition or the election on which the ballot would 
have appeared has passed. Both courts have ruled that 
declaratory judgment actions are proper because the challenged 
law remains on the books and "it is reasonable to expect that 
3. For a more detailed discussion of Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act and 
Appellants' entitlement to declaratory relief in this case see 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pp. 23-24 (R. at 66-67); Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum, 
pp. 7-8 (R. at 183-184); Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County Bd. 
of Health. 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985); and Baird v. State. 574 P.2d 
713 (Utah 1978). 
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the same controversy will recur between these two parties" 
when the Appellants make "future attempts to obtain signatures 
necessary to place the issue on the ballot." Meyer v. Grant, 
108 S. Ct. 1886, 1990 n. 2 (1988); Grant v. Mever. 828 F.2d 
1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1987)(en banc). 
Finally, even if the declaratory claims were assumed 
to be moot, it is well established in Utah precedent that even 
though an appellate court upholds a trial court's 
determination that a particular issue is moot, the appellate 
court may "retain jurisdiction over the nondispositive [or 
moot] issues where the public interest is involved and where 
there are 'questions of constitutional interpretation, issues 
as to the validity or construction of a statute, or the 
propriety of administrative rulings.'" W. & G. Co. v. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755, 765 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)(quoting, McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 
1191 (Utah 1974)); see also Wickham v. Fisher. 629 P.2d 896, 
899-900 (Utah 1981). This appeal falls well within these 
guidelines. The declaratory claims concern the interpretation 
of the Utah and United States Constitutions and the 
construction of Utah and federal statutes. The resolution of 
these claims impacts important rights of the public to engage 
in political speech and petition its government for redress of 
grievances. Not only will the entry of declaratory judgment 
in this matter serve the useful purpose of setting forth the 
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r i g h t s of t h e c i t i z e n s of U tah , b u t i t w i l l a l s o r e s o l v e 
f u t u r e c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t need n o t come b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t and 
t h e r e b y c o n s e r v e j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s . 
For t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h a b o v e , t h e Cour t s h o u l d 
r e v e r s e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e d e c l a r a t o r y 
judgment c l a i m s a r e moot and e n t e r judgment on t h e d e c l a r a t o r y 
c l a i m s a s s e t f o r t h be low . 
I I . THE UTAH CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THAT THE PEOPLE MAY 
BRING A REFERENDUM AGAINST THE ENTIRELY NEW TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED BY PAYSON CITY. 
Art ic le VI, sect ion 1 of the Utah Const i tut ion 
guarantees the people the r igh t to i n i t i a t e "any desired 
l e g i s l a t i o n " or to review "any law or ordinance" by popular 
vote . See t ex t of a r t i c l e VI, supra a t v i . Application of 
sect ion 1 i s r e l a t i v e l y straightforward: l e g i s l a t i v e act ions 
by government e n t i t i e s are subject to i n i t i a t i v e s and 
referenda, other governmental act ions (such as adminis t ra t ive 
decision making) are not.4 
Simply s t a t ed , the issue presented in t h i s appeal i s 
whether or not the enactment of a new tax scheme i s a 
" l e g i s l a t i v e " act t ha t may be referred to the people. Utah, 
4. To f a c i l i t a t e the orderly use of the the i n i t i a t i v e and referral 
r ight , the l e g i s l a t u r e i s authorized to prescribe the min i s ter ia l 
tasks required to get the issue to the b a l l o t , i . e . the forms to 
use, number of s ignatures and time deadl ines . The l e g i s l a t u r e does 
not have the power to preempt one type of l e g i s l a t i o n , be i t a new 
tax scheme or new zoning ordinance, from the people 's r ight of 
re ferra l without amending the Constitut ion. 
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like most other states, has identified several tests that are 
generally used to distinguish between legislative and 
administrative ordinances: 
(1) "'The crucial test for 
determining what is legislative and 
what is administrative is whether the 
ordinance is one making a new law, or 
one executing a law already in 
existence.'" Keialey v. Bench, 97 
Utah 69, 89 P.2d 480, 484 
(1939)(quoting, Whitbeck v. Funk. 140 
Or. 70, 12 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1932)). 
(2) "'Acts constituting a declaration 
of public purposes and making 
provisions of ways and means of 
accomplishment may be generally 
classified as calling for the exercise 
of legislative power.'" Keialey v. 
Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P.2d 480, 484 
(1939)(quoting, State v. Charles, 136 
Kan. 875, 18 P.2d 149, 150 (1933)). 
(3) "'In determining whether the 
ordinance in question was legislative 
or administrative, we notice that the 
authorities . . . are in accord that 
actions which relate to subjects of a 
permanent or general character are 
considered to be legislative, while 
those which are temporary in operation 
and effect are not.'" Keialey v. 
Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P.2d 480, 484 
(1939)(quoting, Monahan v. Funk, 137 
Or. 580, 3 P.2d 778, 779 (1931)). 
(4) The Court has also looked to a 
"practicality test" in finding an 
ordinance to be administrative in 
nature: i.e., that the particular 
ordinance requires that an action be 
performed by "persons having 
specialized training and experience." 
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Shriver v. Bench, 6 Utah 2d 329, 313 
P.2d 475, 478 (1957) . 5 
Although Utah courts have not previously been 
required to apply these t e s t s to determine whether the 
enactment of an e n t i r e l y new tax scheme i s a l e g i s l a t i v e or 
administrat ive ac t , other s t a t e s have. The other s t a t e s that 
haves applied these t e s t s to the enactment of a new tax scheme 
have concluded that such enactments are l e g i s l a t i v e a c t s . See 
Ci t i zens For Financia l ly Responsible Government v. City of 
Spokane, 99 Wash. 2d. 339, 662 P.2d 845, 850-851 
(1983)(enactment of a business and occupation tax by the c i t y 
"was a l e g i s l a t i v e act under any appl icable t e s t " ) ; Campbell 
v . City of Euaene. 116 Or. 264, 240 P. 418, 424 (1925) ("the 
enactment of the charter amendment . . . involves a question 
of taxat ion , and i s l e g i s l a t i v e . " ) ; see a l s o Rocky Mountain 
Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State Board of Equal. , 749 P.2d 221, 240 
(Wyo. 1987) ("The power to tax i s a l e g i s l a t i v e power."); Rego 
5. The Utah Supreme Court, on at l eas t three occasions, has used 
combinations of the above t e s t s to determine whether an action is 
l eg i s l a t ive or administrat ive. See Keiglev v. Bench. 97 Utah 69, 
89 P.2d 480 (1939) (court re l ied on "new law" t e s t to determine 
that an ordinance making changes in a pr ior bond ordinance was 
p a r t i a l l y l eg i s l a t ive and p a r t i a l l y administrat ive); Shriver v. 
Bench. 6 Utah 2d 329, 313 P.2d 475 (1957) (court used a 
combination of the t e s t s to rule that a c i ty ordinance se t t ing the 
sa la r ies of policemen and firemen was an administrative function); 
and Wilson v. Manning. 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982) (a combination of 
the t e s t s i s used to rule that i n i t i a l enactments of zoning 
ordinances are generally l eg i s la t ive actions and amendments to 
zoning are generally administrat ive) . 
- 1 9 -
Properties Corp, v. Finance Adm'r. 102 Misc. 2d 641, 424 
N.Y.S. 2d 621, 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980)("The power to lay a 
tax . . . is exclusively a legislative function.")(quoting, 
Matter of Mollenhauer's Will, 257 A.D. 286, 13 N.Y.S. 2d 619, 
621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939)); In Re Garrison Div. Conservancy 
Dist.. 144 N.W. 2d 82, 95 (N.D. 1966)("The power to levy taxes 
is a legislative power . . . [that ultimately] rests with the 
people.").6 
The imposition of the new utility tax in Payson meets 
all the relevant tests established by the Utah Supreme Court 
for legislative action. First, such an ordinance is new and 
does not involve the mere application of existing law. Prior 
to 1990, the tax did not exist and the citizens were not 
required to pay such a tax to Payson City. Second, such an 
Ordinance tends to be permanent in nature. The Ordinance 
creating the new tax does not have a sunset provision and the 
tax is currently being imposed and will continue to be imposed 
indefinitely. Third, such an Ordinance is a means of 
accomplishing the general public purpose of raising revenue 
for such "city projects" as capital improvements to the golf 
course, a culinary well and engineering for pressurized 
irrigation. (R. at 56-58, 104); see generally 5 E. McQuillin, 
6. The enactment or levy of a new or separate tax by a legal 
subdivision is generally perceived as a "legislative" matter: "In 
levying taxes, a county board acts in a legislative capacity." 
20 C.J.S. Counties § 283 (1940 & Cum. Supp. 1989). 
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The Law of Municipal Corporations § 16.55 (3d ed. 1989). 
Fourth, ascertaining the wisdom vel non of a new tax does not 
call for any "specialized training and experience7' beyond the 
ken of the ordinary taxpayer. Shriver v. Bench, 313 P.2d at 
478. Indeed, any conclusion that taxpayers are incompetent to 
pass upon the practical wisdom of a new tax scheme would 
dramatically re-order fundamental principles of American 
democracy. Instead of forming the basis of government, "We 
the people," would become the hostages of government. U.S. 
Const. Preamble. 
Although Utah has not been required to directly 
determine whether an entirely new tax scheme is a legislative 
act, this Court has indirectly reviewed this issue and 
declared that municipal ordinances establishing new taxes are 
legislative acts. In Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. 
Farminaton City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Utah 1979) and Davis v. 
Oaden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, 623 (1950), this Court 
reviewed the constitutionality of a newly enacted municipal 
business revenue tax and a occupation tax, and declared that 
in reviewing the taxes it would not question the "legislative 
discretion" or "wisdom or policy of the [tax] law[s]." 
The Court should also note, that experience shows 
that laws establishing tax schemes are legislative acts that 
are subject to initiatives and referenda in Utah. Since Utah 
Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2)(b)'s prohibition against initiatives 
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and referenda for "tax levies" was enacted the state has 
allowed various legislative acts relating to tax legislation 
to be initiated for referred. For example, the 1990 general 
election ballot included a tax initiative on whether the state 
sales tax act should be amended to exempt food sales from 
sales tax. In addition, the 1988 general election ballot 
included three tax initiatives: (1) whether an income tax 
credit should be given to Utah families who choose to educate 
their children at home, (2) whether the tax and spending 
limitations in the state should be amended, and (3) whether 
the People's Tax Reduction Act should be enacted. 
Based on the foregoing, it is beyond dispute that the 
imposition of an entirely new tax — like the new utility tax 
ordinance involved here — is a legislative act. As a result, 
article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution authorizes 
Appellants to submit such legislation to the legal voters of 
Payson City. The Appellants are entitled to a declaration 
that they may initiate or refer an entirely new tax scheme 
such as the Payson City utility tax. 
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III. APPELLANTS HAVE AN INDEPENDENT FEDERAL RIGHT TO REFER 
THE NEW UTILITY TAX SCHEME. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that when a 
state constitution grants its people the right to initiate or 
refer legislative acts it creates a federal right to petition 
the government that is protected under the United States 
Constitution: 
The First Amendment provides that Congress 
"shall make no law • . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances. The Fourteenth Amendment 
makes that prohibition applicable to the 
State[s]. 
[T]he circulation of a petition involves the 
type of interactive communication concerning 
political change that is appropriately 
described as "core political speech." 
Appellees seek by petition to achieve 
political change in Colorado; their right 
freely to engage in discussion concerning the 
need for that change is guarded by the First 
Amendment. 
Mever v. Grant. 486 U.S. 414, 108 S. Ct. 
1886, 1891-1892 (1988) (citations omitted). 
In Meyer. the Court ruled that Colorado could not 
impose limitations on the people's, state-created initiative 
right or otherwise interfere with that right unless there was 
an overriding state interest. There, the court ruled that a 
state statute prohibiting the plaintiff from paying workers to 
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circulate petition copies and circulation sheets infringed on 
the plaintiffs initiative rights because it abridged his 
right to be involved in free political speech. The court also 
held that the state's concern to ensure that only initiatives 
that had sufficient "grass-roots" support were placed on the 
ballot did not override plaintiff's right to free speech and 
to petition the government. The court explained that other 
Colorado laws that prescribed who could sign the petition and 
the number of individuals who had to sign the petition 
provided sufficient protection to ensure that only initiatives 
with sufficient support were actually placed before the 
people. Meyer. 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1894. 
In the present case, there is no overriding state 
interest in preventing the people from bringing a referendum 
against the legislative enactment of a new tax. The state's 
interest in ensuring that local governments are not unduly 
restricted in completing their administrative tasks is 
protected by state law that prevents the use of referenda and 
initiatives to challenge administrative! acts. 
Inasmuch as the Appellant's First Amendment right to 
petition the government for redress of grievances and to 
engage in political speech have been abridged by the 
Appellees' refusal to provide them with petition copies, the 
Appellants' may obtain relief under the Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1986), and a declaration that the Appellees' 
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conduct violated their civil rights. See the complete text of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, supra at vi; see also Dennis v. Hiqqins. 
U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991) (an action under § 1983 will 
stand when "'any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws" are abridged) (emphasis in 
original, citations omitted). 
As part of this judgment, the Appellants are entitled 
to an order awarding them reasonable attorneys' fees. 42 
U.S.C. § 1988. Attorneys fees under § 1988 are awarded, and 
are appropriate in this case, because all of society is 
benefited when a plaintiff successfully obtains a judicial 
declaration that protects and secures a constitutional and 
civil right of the people. 
IV. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-11-21(2) ONLY BARS THE REFERRAL 
AND INITIATIVE OP THE "PROPERTY TAX MILL LEVY." IT 
DOES NOT PREVENT THE REFERRAL OF A NEW TAX SCHEME. 
Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21 reads as follows: 
[T]he legal voters of any county, 
city, or town, in numbers required by 
this chapter, may initiate any desired 
legislation and cause it to be 
submitted to the governing body or to 
a vote of the people of the county, 
city, or town for approval or 
rejection, or may require any law or 
ordinance passed by the governing body 
of the county, city, or town to be 
submitted to the voters before the law 
or ordinance takes effect. 
(2)(a) The legal voters of any 
county, city, or town may not initiate 
budgets or changes in budgets, or tax 
levies, or changes in tax levies, 
(b) The legal voters of any county, 
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city, or town may not require any 
budget or tax levy adopted by the 
governing body of the county, city, or 
town to be submitted to the voters. 
Utah Code Ann. § 2 0-11-21 (emphasis added). 
Appellees contend that the above statute means that 
initiatives and referenda may not be brought against any 
ordinance that deals with taxes. Appellants, on the other 
hand, contend that the legislative proscription of a popular 
vote to challenge a "budget" or a "tax levy" refers solely to 
the ministerial processes associated with administering a 
budget or setting a tax levy pursuant to legislative fiat, and 
does not include the legislative decisions taken in 
appropriating money for a budget, enacting a new taxing 
scheme, or in setting a tax rate which involves a policy 
choice rather than ministerial arithmetic calculations. 
As previously discussed, the '"power to lay a tax, to 
determine the proportion thereof to be exacted from specified 
individuals or groups, [and] to determine its incidence, [are] 
exclusively legislative functionfs].'" Reao Properties v. 
Finance Admin.. 102 Misc. 2d 641, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 621, 623 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1980)(citations omitted). Consequently, significant 
litigation has evolved throughout the country as to whether 
the legislative body can delegate any of ministerial tasks 
associated with the enactment and imposition of taxes (i.e. 
power to set rates or determine property groups). Generally, 
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i t i s accepted t h a t ce r t a in min i s t e r i a l t asks may be delegated 
to agencies or commissions if de f in i t i ve formulas and 
guidel ines are prescribed by the l e g i s l a t i v e body. Id. a t 
624-625. By way of summary then, l e g i s l a t i v e ac t s t ha t cannot 
be delegated would include such policy-type act ions as 
deciding (1) the type of tax scheme tha t i s to be used to 
r a i s e the revenue,7 (2) the amount of revenue t ha t should be 
ra ised from the p a r t i c u l a r t ax , 8 and (3) the r a t e a t which the 
tax levy wi l l be imposed.9 The adminis t ra t ive tasks 
associated with administering a tax tha t may be delegated 
would include such items as (1) preparing the tax not ices , (2) 
conducting property assessments, (3) co l l ec t ing and dispensing 
the tax , and (4) in the property tax scheme, using the 
7. Pursuant to Utah Const, a r t . XIII, § 12, the Legislature has the power to 
enact various tax schemes. See also Utah Const, a r t XIII, § 2(11) (The 
Legislature shal l provide by law for an annual tax suff icient . . . to 
defray the estimated ordinary expenses." (emphasis added). 
8. Annually, the Legislature determines the amount of money to be 
appropriated and collected. Utah Const, a r t . VII, § 8; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-38-3. The Governor has veto power over these appropriations. Id; 
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-5-101 to 131 and 10-6-101 to 159 for the 
corresponding powers of municipali t ies and counties. 
9. An example that i l l u s t r a t e s that the se t t ing of a tax rate is a 
l eg i s l a t i ve act i s found in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-905: "The Legislature 
shal l set the minimum rate of levy on each dollar of taxable value of 
taxable property . . . to pay the s t a t e ' s contribution to the cost of 
the minimum school program for that year. (emphasis added). 
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statutory formula found in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-913(2) to set 
many of the general property tax levies*.10 
The first question presented here, therefore, is to 
determine whether the proper legal construction of the term 
"tax levy" as used in Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2) refers to a 
legislative or administrative task. If "tax levy" refers to a 
legislative task the statute must be declared 
unconstitutional. The starting point for interpreting any 
statute is the plain language of the enactment. P.I.E. 
Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 
(Utah 1988)("The best evidence of the true intent and purpose 
of the Legislature in enacting the Act i s the plain language 
of the Act")(citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 
679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). When interpreting the plain 
language of § 20-11-21(2), the statute should be "closely 
scrutinized and narrowly construed" so as to preserve the 
peopled right to petition the government. Meyer v. Grant, 
486 U.S. 414, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 1892-1893 (1988).n Legislative 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-913(2) provides that once the governing body has 
exerc ised i t s l e g i s l a t i v e authority to decide how much revenue needs to 
be ra i sed , the governing body s h a l l perform the administrative task of 
determining the general property tax levy. The governing body 
c a l c u l a t e s t h i s rate by taking the revenue amount, d iv iding i t by the 
"taxable value of a l l property taxed, l e s s estimated deferrals or 
abatements in the current tax year, [and mult iplying the dividend] by 
the percentage of property taxes c o l l e c t e d for the immediately preceding 
f i s c a l year." 
11. Accord. 5 E. McQuillin, The Laws of Municipal Corporations § 16.51 (3rd ed. 
1989) (as a general ru le , "grants of power to . . . adopt municipal 
l e g i s l a t i o n by exerc i se of i n i t i a t i v e or referendum are to be l i b e r a l l y 
construed to the ends of permitting rather than r e s t r i c t i n g the power"). 
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h i s t o r y , moreover, may be used to c l a r i f y any ambiguity in the 
p la in language of the s ta tu te . 1 2 Here, whether the 
in terpre ta t ion of "tax levy" i s based upon p la in language, 
s ta tutory context , or l e g i s l a t i v e in ten t , Utah Code Ann. § 2 0-
11-21 does not support the Appel lees ' refusal to provide 
Appellants with c e r t i f i e d p e t i t i o n cop ie s . 
A. "Tax L e w / as used in § 20-11-21(2) and 
elsewhere in the Utah Code, means the 
m i n i s t e r i a l process of determining and l i s t i n g 
the general property tax rate e s tab l i shed 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 3 59-2-913(2) . 
An examination of the pos s ib l e meanings of the term 
"tax levy" revea l s at l e a s t two d i f f erent denotat ions . F i r s t , 
"tax levy" may be interpreted to mean the " l e g i s l a t i v e 
function" of enacting a new tax scheme.13 Second, "tax levy" 
may be interpreted t o mean the "minis ter ia l function of 
l i s t i n g and extending taxes" ( i . e . . the l i s t i n g of the general 
tax rate under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2 -913(2) ) . 1 4 These two 
12. P . I . E . Employees. 759 P.2d a t 1151 ("When the language of a p a r t i c u l a r 
p rov i s i on of a s t a t u t e i s ambiguous, the Court may a t tempt , following 
p r i n c i p l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , to a s c e r t a i n the i n t e n t i o n of the 
L e g i s l a t u r e " ) ; DeLuca v. Department of Employment S e c . 746 P.2d 276, 
277-278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("where a s t a t u t e i s ambiguous, we examine 
the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t in enac t ing the s t a t u t e " ) . 
13. B lack ' s Law Dic t ionary 1308 (5th ed. 1989)(" tax levy" means " the b i l l , 
enactment or measure of l e g i s l a t i o n by which an annual or genera l tax is 
imposed"). See a l s o Fenton v. City of Delano. 162 Cal . App. 3d 400, 208 
Cal . Rptr . 486 (5th D i s t . Ct. App. 1984) (" tax levy" means the general 
enactment of tax p r o v i s i o n s ) ; Dare v. Lakeport City Council . 12 Cal. 
App. 3d 864, 91 Cal . Rptr . 124 (1s t D i s t . Ct. App. 1970) (" tax levy" 
def ined to inc lude tax ordinance levying tax on usage of sewer 
f a c i l i t i e s ) . 
14. B lack ' s Law Dic t ionary 816 (5th ed. 1989); Brooks v. Zabka. 168 Colo. 265, 
450 P.2d 653 (1969). 
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d i f f e r e n t meanings of the term "tax levy" r e s u l t from the fact 
that the imposit ion of a tax i s a m u l t i p l e - s t e p process , and 
several s t eps may be somewhat imprecisely referred to as the 
"tax levy." 1 5 
Despite the p o s s i b i l i t y of two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the 
term "tax l e v y , " a thorough reading of Utah tax s t a t u t e s 
revea l s that the Utah l e g i s l a t u r e did not use the term "tax 
levy" to mean the enactment of a new tax scheme. With l imited 
except ion, 1 6 the term "tax levy" i s used throughout Utah's tax 
s t a t u t e s t o denote the m i n i s t e r i a l s tep of determining the 
general rate of tax t o be applied t o property under the 
property tax a c t . See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-902(2)("The 
commission s h a l l . . . determine . . . the amount t o be raised 
by the minimum bas ic tax l e v y . " ) ; Utah Code Ann. §§ 59 -2 -
913(2) (The property tax "levy s e t for each appl icable fund of 
the taxing e n t i t y i s determined by d iv id ing the budgeted 
property tax revenues . . . by the sum of the taxable value of 
a l l property t a x e d . " ) ; Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-923 ("a taxing 
15. "Tax levies" are frequently referred to as "mill levies" because the rate 
of the tax i s se t in a decimal that equates to one tenth of cent. For 
example, a tax ra te of one mill (.001) equates to $1 of tax on every 
$1,000 of taxable property value. The term "levy" is frequently 
interchanged with " r a t e . " For example, "the school d i s t r i c t tax levy is 
three mil ls ( .003)." 
16. As previously noted "tax levy" is used occasionally in the Utah Code to 
denote specif ic property tax lev ies , such as the minimum school levy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-905. These specif ic levies are usually set by 
l eg i s l a t i ve act and are not determined pursuant to a s ta tu tory formula 
as i s the general property tax levy. 
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entity which intends to exceed its certified tax levy may not 
adopt its final budget."); Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-
924(2)(a)("The certified tax rate shall be the actual 
levy.") .17 
Not only is the Utah Code consistent in using the 
term "tax levy" to mean the general property tax levy rate, 
but the Utah Code is also consistent in not using the term to 
describe a municipality7s power to establish or enact a new 
tax scheme. Rather, the Utah Code consistently distinguishes 
the power to impose (or collect) a tax from the power to 
establish a tax rate (or levy). For example, code sections 
that allow municipalities to impose new tax schemes generally 
refer to the power as the right to "levy and collect taxes:" a 
"municipality may raise revenue by levying and collecting a 
license fee or tax" (Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-203 (emphasis 
added); "special taxes shall be levied and collected" (Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-4)(emphasis added). 
Additional guidance in interpreting the meaning of 
"tax levy" may be obtained from the Colorado Supreme Court's 
decision in Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 265, 450 P.2d 653 
(1969). In Brooks v. Zabka, the court was required to decide 
17. See generally. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-901 to 924; i.e. § 59-2-912 ("Time 
for adoption of levy . . . The governing body of each entity shall 
before June 22 of each year, adopt a proposed . . . final tax rate."); 
§ 59-2-913(3)("The format of the statement shall . . . cite . . . 
provisions which limit the property tax levy for any taxing entity."). 
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whether a referendum could be brought to challenge a sales tax 
ordinance when the city charter expressly provided that 
referenda could not be used for "ordinances making the tax 
levy [and] making the annual appropriation." Id. at 655. In 
Brooks v. Zabka, the Court determined that the statutory "tax 
levy" language referred to the property tax mill levy. The 
Court based its decision on two primary considerations: (1) 
plain language and (2) the practical need not to allow a 
referendum on the establishment of annual property tax rates. 
Id. 
The Court first concluded that the "tax levy" 
referred to property taxes. Inasmuch as the Colorado Code was 
replete with references and certification requirements for the 
"tax levy" and the property tax levy was the only tax levy so 
referred to, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the "tax 
levy" meant the property tax levy. Id. The Court recognized 
that the determination of the property tax levy was an annual 
occurrence and tended to be administrative in nature. The 
Court then recognized that the enactment of a sales tax 
provision was significantly different from the "tax levy" 
because it was an entirely "new scheme of taxation" and thus 
did not bear the same time constraints the "tax levy" bore in 
its annual ascertainment. Id. The referendum for the sales 
tax issue was therefore allowed. 
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Although the law underlying the Colorado decision is 
not identical to Utah law, the opinion nevertheless provides 
useful guidance here. Like the Colorado Code, the Utah Code 
is replete with references to the ''tax levy" as the annual 
administrative act of setting the general tax rate on 
applicable property. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-901 to 924. 
Moreover, like the tax at issue in Brooks v. Zabka, the 
municipal ordinance challenged here is a "new scheme of 
taxation." See Brooks v. Zabka, 450 P.2d at 653. 
Furthermore, there are no practical impediments to use of a 
public referendum to challenge the legislative imposition of a 
new tax, as there might be with popular challenges to the 
annual ministerial — and time sensitive — calculations of 
the general property tax levy. See Brooks v. Zabka, 450 P.2d 
at 655. As a result, Brooks v. Zabka supports the 
interpretation of § 20-11-21(2) urged by Appellants. 
"Tax levy," as used in Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2), 
means the "general tax levy rate." If, however, the 
consistent use of the term "tax levy" in the Utah Code is 
insufficient to remove all doubt as to the meaning of the 
term, reference to the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 20-11-21(2) confirms that "tax levy" means the "general 
property tax mill levy rate." 
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B. The legislative intent surrounding § 2 0-11-21(2) 
reveals that "tax levy" means the general 
property tax mill levy. 
Prior to 1985, Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21 mirrored 
article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution and placed no 
limitations on the use of the initiative or referendum power. 
In 1985, the legislature passed Senate Bill 80 and amended 
§ 20-11-21 by adding subsection (2): 
The legal voters of any county, city, 
or town may initiate any desired 
legislation in accordance with 
Sections 20-11-26 through 20-11-36. 
Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2)(1985). 
Section 20-11-26, in turn, stated that the legal voters could 
initiate desired legislation by adopting any "measure." 
Section 20-11-27, however, defined "measure" to mean "any 
ordinance, resolution or franchise, but . . . not a budget, 
mill levy, or zoning ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-27(3) 
(1985) (emphasis added). 
Subsequent to the 1985 amendments, it became apparent 
that some zoning laws could not be constitutionally excluded 
from the initiative power because they were legislative in 
nature. Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982). In an 
effort to rectify this problem and to clarify the procedures 
associated with the initiative and referendum power as they 
related to cities and counties, the 1987 legislature amended 
Section 20-11-21 by passing Senate Bill No. 9. Senate Bill 
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No. 9 repealed Sections 20-11-26 through 20-11-36 and amended 
Section 20-11-21(2) to read as follows: 
(2) (a) The legal voters of any county, 
city, or town may not initiate budgets 
or changes in budgets, or tax levies 
or changes in tax levies. 
(b) The legal voters of any county, 
city, or town may not require any 
budget or tax levy be adopted by the 
governing body of the county, city, or 
town to be submitted to the voters. 
When the sponsor of Senate Bill No. 9, Senator Finlinson, 
explained the changes to Section 20-11-21(2), he acknowledged 
that the limitation on zoning ordinances had been removed (1) 
because not all zoning ordinances were administrative in 
nature and (2) because legislative zoning ordinances had to be 
amenable to the people by way of initiatives or referenda.18 
As to the language of "budgets or tax levies," Senator 
Finlinson explained that this language was merely intended to 
provide continuation of the limitations that had existed in 
the previous statute against mill levies. The discussion from 
the Senate floor debates reveals that the limitations 
contained in § 20-11-21(2)(a) & (b) were to prevent the use of 
initiatives and referenda to challenge a governing body's 
actions to determine the rate at which the property tax is to 
18. A transcript of the Senate debates on Senate Bill No. 9 is found in the 
Record at 37-47. 
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be levied . Transcr ip t . Senate Floor Debates on Utah Senate 
Bi l l 9, 1987 (R. a t 38)("So the b i l l r e a l l y does bring 
uniformity with the c i t i e s and the count ies , and i t follows 
now the wi l l of the Senate in saying the budgets and mil l 
l ev ies are not subject to referendum.")(emphasis added). 
Not only do the comments of the l e g i s l a t o r s 
demonstrate t h a t the meaning of "tax l ev i e s " denotes the 
annual s e t t i n g of the general property tax r a t e , but ru les of 
s t a tu to ry construct ion a lso y ie ld the same conclusion. This 
Court i s required to give a s t a t u t e a cons t i t u t i ona l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i f poss ible . 1 9 As explained in Section I I , 
above, the Utah Const i tut ion authorizes referenda for 
" l e g i s l a t i v e " ac t s but not for "adminis t ra t ive" ac t s . 2 0 If 
" tax levy" i s read, as intended by the l e g i s l a t u r e , to mean 
the s e t t i n g and evaluation of the general tax r a t e or mil l 
levy to be used for property tax purposes, § 20-11-21(2) may 
well be cons t i t u t i ona l because the s e t t i n g of the general mil l 
levy pursuant to a ro te formula may be c l a s s i f i e d as an 
19. See State v. Lindquist. 674 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1983) ( " i t is the duty of 
th i s Court to construe a s ta tu te to avoid cons t i tu t iona l inf i rmi t ies 
whenever poss ib le") ; Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n.. 
657 P.2d 1293, 1294 (Utah 1982)("statutes where possible , are to be 
construed so as to sustain the i r cons t i t u t i ona l i t y " ) . 
20. The Utah Supreme Court has consis tent ly upheld a c i t i z e n ' s r ight to refer 
and i n i t i a t e " l eg i s l a t ive" ac t s . See Wilson v. Manning. 657 P.2d 251, 
253 (Utah 1982) ( i n i t i a t i v e s and referenda only apply to ordinances that 
are l eg i s l a t i ve in character) ; Shriver v. Bench. 6 Utah 2d 329, 313 P.2d 
475, 476 (1957) ( " i n i t i a t i v e and referendum laws apply only to matters 
which are l e g i s l a t i v e " ) . 
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administrative act. This interpretation would also comply 
with the United States Supreme Court's direction that 
"statutes that limit the power of the people to initiate 
legislation are to be closely scrutinized and narrowly 
construed" so as to preserve the people's right to petition 
the government. Meyer v. Grant. 486 U.S. 414, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 
1892-1893 (1988). If "tax levy" is read to mean the creation 
of a new tax scheme, however, then the statute violates both 
the state and federal constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument, Appellants respectfully 
request that the Court reverse the District Courts December 
2, 1990 Summary Judgment and enter an order that (1) declares 
that the enactment of a new tax scheme like the Ordinance is a 
legislative act that is subject to referendum and initiative, 
(2) declare that "tax levy" as used in Utah Code Ann. § 2 0-11-
21(2) only denotes the setting of the property tax mill levy, 
or in the alternative, that "tax levy" denotes a legislative 
act and thus Utah Code Ann. § 20-11-21(2) is unconstitutional 
because it proscribes the referral of "any legislation," (3) a 
declaration that Appellees violated Appellants' federal and 
civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they 
refused to recognize the Application and not issue certified 
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petition copies, and (4) a declaration and order that 
Appellants are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of April, 1992 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
MarkKT Buchi 
David J. Crapo 
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